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Abstract
In this paper we investigate, against the background of Goodwin's (1967)
model, the macroeconomic consequences of the introduction of an unemploy-
ment bene¯t system and a minimum wage barrier for both skilled and unskilled
workers. In the analyzed framework, characterized by free \hiring" and \¯ring"
in the ¯rst labor markets, we can show a) that large °uctuations in employment
are made (at least partially) socially acceptable through the workfare nature of
the unemployment bene¯t system and b) that a minimum real wages provides
additional stability to the system dynamics by decreasing the amplitude of the
°uctuations in employment and income distribution (and the related degrada-
tion of the workforce skills and family structures) they are otherwise subject
to.
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11 Introduction
In recent times a controversial debate about the establishment of minimum wages
in certain sectors or even throughout the economy has taken place at several levels
(in parliament, in the media and between economists) of the German society. This
controversy has been triggered by the signi¯cant rise of jobs with low salaries at or
even below the subsistence level since the 1990s { documented in Rhein and Stamm
(2006) and Bosch and Kalina (2007) { on the one hand, as well as by the fact that the
income of top managers has been rising drastically faster than the average income of
employees over the last decades. For example, according to Klesse and Voss (2007),
the annual income of top managers of the largest 100 companies in Germany with
total revenues exceeding 5 billion Euro has increased by the factor 8 over the last
30 years { while the general level of earned income in the same period (GDP) has
risen by the factor 4.5.
In the minimum wage debate, its opponents have argued, along the neoclassical
tradition, with the employment costs of such a regulation, see e.g. Sinn (2007). The
main argument is well known: According with the underlying notion that employers
always hire labor up to the point where real wages equal their marginal product,
a lower bound on the real wage rate reduces employment and, thus, raises unem-
ployment with all its negative e®ects for the economy (assuming that the marginal
product at the current point of employment is below the minimum real wage rate).
There are, however, important arguments which speak for a much weaker causal
relationship between real wage increases and higher unemployment than it is pre-
dicted by the neoclassical framework: On the one hand, there is nowadays a broad
consensus on the fact that institutions play a more important role than the for
a long time only considered real wage e®ect in the determination of employment
(the change of perspectives between the OECD-Job Study (1994) and the OECD-
Employment Outlook (2006) in these respects is overwhelming). On the other hand,
the rise in aggregate demand generated by the higher disposable income of low wage
workers resulting from the establishment of a minimum wage is also likely to coun-
teract the eventual decrease in employment, so that the ¯nal e®ect on output is
not unambiguous a priori, as many neoclassical economists still state. But last but
not least, the question of whether and to what extent societies succeed in achieving
the ful¯llment of human rights for all their citizens (since social progress implies
an evolution of societies that comprises more than just economic goals in a narrow
sense) is an important issue which should also be addressed in the minimum wage
2debate and on general terms which should be a major concern for policy makers (an
aspect often neglected by economists who look only at the economic sub-system of
societies when enunciating policy recommendations).
In this paper we will therefore show in a supply side framework that minimum
(real) wages can be bene¯cial to the working of a modern capitalist economy (charac-
terized by a high state of labor productivity and income per worker), at least in the
longer run. As we will discuss, when the minimum wage barrier is chosen properly,
its introduction can lead to economic and social outcomes that clearly dominate the
situation of no minimum wages (delaying at most the rise in employment to a cer-
tain degree). Since solutions to the mass unemployment problems should involve an
active participation of both capital and labor, upper bounds in real wage evolution
also may be of help in such a context. In addition, we emphasize however (from
the perspective of the model of this paper), that proper minimum real wages and
unemployment bene¯ts should be accompanied by working regulations that allow
°exible hiring and ¯ring on the part of employers in the economy (as assumed by the
model). Hence, employers should be able to react °exibly and quickly to changes in
the economic situation.
Extending the work by Flaschel and Greiner (2008), we introduce in this paper
low-skilled labor, with a money wage formation of a di®erent type than in the high-
skilled labor market. As we will show, since an additional minimum wage for this
type of labor does not alter the macro-behavior of the economy to a signi¯cant
extent, the introduction of such a minimum wage barrier in the low-skilled segment
is likely to improve the overall performance of the economy, namely through the
less severe °uctuations in economic activity as discussed in Flaschel and Greiner
(2008). In addition, this measure is likely to increase the low skilled workers' social
acceptance of their situation, which in this case is not completely decoupled from
the normal path of the economy, since in this new framework the employers cannot
exploit the weak bargaining power situation of the former without limits anymore.
Temporarily, employment in this segment may su®er from such minimum real wages.
Yet, in the longer run the economy is likely to function in a better way and, thus,
also to bring about improvements in the situation of low-skilled workers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we extend
the classical Goodwin model of such an employment cycle { to be used in this pa-
per as point of reference { with a labor market characterized by queuing features
between two groups of workers, skilled and unskilled, and show how they react to
low reservation wages and mass unemployment in particular. Section 3 considers
3then a segmented dual labor market with the same two groups of workers and how
general regulations concerning basic income needs, minimum wages, but also maxi-
mum wages modify (and improve) the employment dynamics of the Goodwin model.
Section 4 concludes.
In the paper we assume real wage setting behavior (in a ¯xed proportions tech-
nology environment).1
2 The Classical employment cycle with a low wage income sector
In this section we provide an extended version of the Goodwin (1967) employment
cycle model of the interaction of income distribution and (un-)employment, as mea-
sured by the wage share and the employment rate. This model will serve as a baseline
framework for our subsequent discussion of the role of base income payments (un-
employment bene¯ts) for all unemployed members of the workforce and minimum



















Figure 1: UK Distributive Cycles 1870{2004: WS=wage share, ER=employment
rate
Considerations along these lines are still of great relevance: As ¯gure 1 clearly
shows, while Goodwin cycle in the UK seems to have been signi¯cantly shorter before
1in place of a neoclassical production function, where employment would be determined by the
slightly more general formula w=p = FL(K;L
d) with no change in the general conclusions of the
paper.
41914, there has been a major change in it after 1945.2 As illustrated in ¯gure 1 by the
data taken from Groth and Madsen (2007), it is clear that employment °uctuations
have experienced an increase in their amplitude during the last 70 years in the UK
economy. In fact, we see in ¯gure 1 two periods of excessive over-employment (in the
language of the theory of the NAIRU) which were followed by periods of dramatic
long underemployment, both started by periods of the more or less pronounced
occurrence of stag°ation.
Generating order and economic viability in market economies by large swings
in the unemployment rate (mass unemployment with human degradation of part of
the families that form the society) is one way to make capitalism work, but it must
surely be critically re°ected with respect to its social and political consequences.
From these alternative perspectives, such a reproduction mechanism does not appear
to be compatible in the long-run with an advanced and democratic society.
The functioning of a capitalist market economy must therefore be contrasted with
alternative social structures of accumulation and labor market institutions which al-
low to combine the situation of a highly competitive market economy (free hiring
and ¯ring) with a human rights bill that includes the right (and the obligation) to
do (social) work (including the preservation of workforce skills), and to obtain an
income from this work that at the least supports basic needs and basic happiness.3
By contrast, a laissez-faire capitalistic society that ruins family structures to a con-
siderable degree (through alienated work, degrading unemployment and education-
and value-decomposing visual media) cannot be made compatible with a democratic
society in the long-run, since it produces con°icts ranging from social segmentation
to class- and racial clashes and more.
In this paper we want to discuss the working of the economy under the assump-
tion of a normal Goodwinian labor market (workers of type 1) that is supplemented
by (and interacts with) a low wage income labor market (workers of type 2) where
we assume labor supply as being so abundant that there is no bottleneck created for
the economy through this low income labor market. We can show in this framework
that minimum real wages provide extra stability to such dynamics by decreasing the
amount of overshooting in employment and distribution they are otherwise subject
to. The labor market in this section is characterized by queuing features; when
2This may be explained by signi¯cant changes in the adjustment processes of market economies
for these two periods: primarily price adjustment before 1914 and primarily quantity adjustments
after 1945.
3\basic" in the sense of \socially acceptable, socially desirable" rather than just \physical".
5the skilled workers (type 1) do not ¯nd a job in the ¯rst labor market, they al-
ways ¯nd one in the second labor market and thus evict unskilled workers (type
2), which are then unemployed. In this simple model, if there is at ¯rst no redis-
tribution scheme from the employed to the unemployed, then the unemployed have
no income at all; we can assume that the unemployed have such a low utility value
(concave utility function in terms of income) that any redistribution to them will
increase the overall aggregate utility. Both working populations are stationary in
time (and given by ¹ L1; ¹ L2) and we consider a ¯xed proportions technology with a
given output capital ratio ¹ x = Y=K and two given employment functions of the
type: Ld
1 = Y=¹ y1;Ld
2 = Y=¹ y2 for the two types of work corresponding to two labor
markets that are performed in the industrial sector of the economy. The functioning
of the labor market is illustrated in graphical form in ¯gure 2 and all abbreviations
are summarized in the table 1 on p. 25.
Figure 2: Labour market system in graphical form
Let us start with the detailed formulation of the model. The growth rate of the
money wage of workers of type 1 is given by:
^ w1 = ¯we(e1 ¡ ¹ e1) + ¯wv(!2 ¡ ¹ !2) + ¼e; ^ w1 = _ w1=w1 (1)
For workers of type 2 we assume that their real wage is in principle ¯xed to the one
of workers of type 1 by a factor a but that there will be additions to or substraction
from it, depending on the state of the business cycle in the ¯rst labor market:
!2 = a!1 + b(e1 ¡ ¹ e1) (2)
Workers of type 2 are therefore not actively involved in wage negotiations, on the
one hand, and have to su®er from income losses in the case of a depressed ¯rst
labor market (and vice versa), on the other hand. Workers of type 1 are negotiating
6nominal wages as in Goodwin (1967), but do this with more success when their
reservation wage (the one of the second labor market) is increasing.
Assuming myopic perfect foresight with respect to price in°ation (^ p = ¼e), the
labor market dynamics can be reduced to the following two equations:4




















where we now use the steady state value of v2 (i.e. v¤
2) as point of reference for the
reservation wage e®ect in the wage Phillips curve of workers of type 1.
Goodwin's accumulation equation for the rate of return on capital ^ K reads in the
considered framework on the basis of a linear technology with no technical change,
(i.e., on the basis of the given input{output proportions ¹ x = Y=K = const., ¹ yi =
Y=Ld
i = const.), and of its extremely classical savings and investment assumptions
(sc = 1;sw = 0) as follows:
^ K = _ K=K =




= ¹ x(1 ¡ v1 ¡ v2) ¡ ± (5)
with ± the depreciation rate of the capital stock.
Given the ¯xed input-output proportions ¹ x and ¹ y1, we get from the de¯nitional
equation e1 = Ld
1=¹ L1 the law of motion of this employment rate of workers of type
1:
^ e1 = ^ K = ¹ x(1 ¡ v1 ¡ v2) ¡ ± = ¹ x
µ
1 ¡ v1 ¡ av1
¹ y1
¹ y2
¡ (b=¹ y2)(e1 ¡ ¹ e1)
¶
¡ ±: (6)
From the above expression we obtain an autonomous 2D system of di®erential
equations in the state variables v1;e1:
_ v1 = [¯we(e1 ¡ ¹ e1) + ¯wv¹ y2(av1¹ y1=¹ y2 + (b=¹ y2)(e1 ¡ ¹ e1) ¡ v¤
2)]v1 (7)
_ e1 = [¹ x(1 ¡ (1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2)v1 ¡ (b=¹ y2)(e1 ¡ ¹ e1)) ¡ ±]e1: (8)
as basis for our discussion of Classical unemployment cycles and their later modi¯-
cation through unemployment bene¯ts and minimum wage payments.
4Note here that v1;v2 represent the wage shares of the workers employed in sectors 1,2 and not
the wage share of workers of type 1,2.
7The uniquely determined interior steady state solution of this system is
v¤
1 =
(¹ x ¡ ±)¹ y2
(¹ y2 + a¹ y1)¹ x
; e¤
1 = ¹ e1 (9)
With respect to this steady state position there holds:
Proposition:
1. The determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the dynamics at the steady
state is positive for all positive parameter values of the dynamics (5),
(6).














there occurs a (degenerate) Hopf-bifurcation where explosive °uctuations
are turned into damped ones for smaller ¯wv and larger b: The inte-
rior steady state of the 2D dynamical system is then in particular locally
asymptotically stable.




1 [¯we + ¯wvb]v¤
1
¡¹ x(1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2)e¤




For the determinant of this Jacobian we therefore get:
detJ = [¡¯wvab¹ y1=¹ y2 + ¯we(1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2) + ¯wv(1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2)b]¹ xv¤
1e¤
1
= (¯we + ¯wvb + a¯we¹ y1=¹ y2)¹ xv¤
1e¤
1 > 0: (11)
This proves the ¯rst part of the proposition. Due to this fact the system can only
loose stability when the trace of J passes through zero and becomes positive. The
above two bifurcation values exactly characterize such a situation.
The proposition states that increasing sensitivity of workers of type 1 to their
reservation wage in the second labor market (i.e. increasing ¯wv) can lead the econ-
omy towards instability, while an increase in the strength by which the state in the
8¯rst labor market changes the remuneration conditions in the second labor market
(i.e. increasing b) outside the steady state stabilizes the economy.5
We have assumed with respect to workers of type 1 that they are always fully
employed (though not necessarily in the ¯rst labor market). This implies for the
employment Ld(2) of low income workers in the second labor market the situation
(¹ L1; ¹ L2 given magnitudes):
Ld(2) = Ld
2 ¡ (1 ¡ e1)¹ L1 (12)
) e2 = Ld(2)=¹ L2 = (Ld
2=K)(K=¹ L2) ¡ (1 ¡ e1)¹ L1=¹ L2 (13)




¹ L1l1;l = l1 + l2):
¹ e2 = ¹ x=¹ y2(K=¹ L2) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹ e1)(¹ L1=¹ L2) = ¹ x=¹ y2=l2 ¡ (1 ¡ ¹ e1)(l1=l2) (14)
if everything is expressed in per unit of capital and evaluated at the steady state.
This expression show the many parameters that are involved in the determination
of the steady state rate of employment of the low income workers.
In order to draw a phase diagram of the dynamics considered in proposition 1
we now calculate the isoclines of their two laws of motion. These isoclines are given
by straight lines de¯ned by:
_ v = 0 = [¯we(e1 ¡ ¹ e1) + ¯wv¹ y2(av1¹ y1=¹ y2 + b=¹ y2(e1 ¡ ¹ e1) ¡ v¤
2)]v1 (15)
_ e = 0 = [¹ x(1 ¡ (1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2)v1 ¡ (b=¹ y2)(e1 ¡ ¹ e1)) ¡ ±]e1: (16)
This implies as explicit representation for the two partial equilibrium curves:
e1j_ v=0 = ¹ e1 ¡
¯wv(av1¹ y1 ¡ v¤
2¹ y2)
¯we + ¯wvb
= ¹ e1 ¡




e1j_ e=0 = ¹ e1 +
¹ x(1 ¡ (1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2)v1) ¡ ±
¹ xb=¹ y2
(18)
We see that both lines are negatively sloped and that the second isocline is steeper
than the ¯rst one. This implies as phase plot of the dynamics the situation shown in
¯gure 3. Note that the steady state is in the north-west corner of the square shown
in ¯gure 3. Its placement in the middle of it is only due to graphical reasons. Note
that there are two more steady states of the dynamics on the axes of the phase space
which however will play no role in the following.
5Note that assuming that output per unit of capital, x, depends to a certain degree on the
relative living standard of the low income workers as variant of an e±ciency wage hypothesis:
x = x(v2 ¡ v
¤
2) = x(b(e1 ¡ ¹ e1)); x
0 > 0
would make the economy even more vulnerable in its stabilizing potential.
9Figure 3: The phase diagram of the Goodwin wage spread cycle
The ¯gure 3 shows the usual clockwise rotation of the Goodwin distributive cycle
mechanism which may be damped or explosive depending on the conditions stated
in proposition 1. In the explosive case we need however at least one additional
mechanism that keeps the dynamics bounded within an economically meaningful
part of the phase space. Since the axes of the phase space are invariant subsets,
convergence to the axes can only take place if there is a steady state position as
limit of this process. This can be excluded for the vertical axes since the interior
dynamics is moving away from this steady state.
With respect to the steady state on the horizontal axes, we assume that the
dynamics is bounded to the right as shown by the dotted line in ¯gure 4. The
motivation for this bound is that we may have mathematical adjustment process
there that can lead the wage share v1 by accelerating wage (price) dynamics to 1.
Even before this point is reached, the economy is no longer capable of reproducing
itself so that in one way or another the behavior of economic agents will change (or
be changed) before such a situation can arise. For reasons of simplicity we have
here assumed a wage-price freeze (as for example imposed on the U.S. economy by
President Nixon in 1971). The dotted line shown in ¯gure 4 shows a perfect wage
{ price freeze once its corresponding wage share level has been reached. As it is
illustrated, the economy moves along it in a downward direction until the _ v1 = 0
isocline is reached from where it starts moving inside again. Since the axes of
the positive quadrant cannot be approached in this area the economy must have
10automatically a lower turning point (in the rate of employment) and a turning point
to the left (in the wage share). As the ¯gure shows, it must also automatically have
an upper turning point (in the rate of employment): If not, it would (similarly to
the wage share) hit a ceiling (of absolute full employment) and move along it until
it would again turn inside when the _ e1 isocline has been crossed.
Figure 4: A \Nixon" type wage-price freeze and the generation of persistent °uctu-
ations in employment and income distribution
Taken together, the model therefore implies in the explosive case the existence
of a limit cycle as shown in ¯gure 4, which is rapidly approached from the outside
in the case of an overheated economy. The model is therefore capable of explaining
damped oscillations or persistent oscillation in the wage share and the employment
rate of workers of type 1 (the ones that are employed in the ¯rst labor market)
(as well as the possibility of crisis scenarios which would call for drastic political
reactions, as the system might be uncapable to ¯nd its way back to stability).
For the employment rate of the workers of type 2 we get on this basis as satellite
system:6
e2 =









Of course we need further modi¯cations of the model, should one of these ex-
pression passes through zero. Note here that the model exhibits increasing wage
6due to our assumption that workers of type 1 are always fully employed if both labor markets
are considered.
11di®erentials in times of depressed activity (e1 < ¹ e1) and that the wage share of
workers of type 2 is in addition reduced by the workers of type 1 that are employed
in the second labor market (i.e. the (1 ¡ e1)-term).
Let us now assume that there is a government wanting to mitigate the recurrent
situations of mass unemployment (which means extreme poverty for workers of type
2 as they have then no income) and low wages in the second labor market by means of
unemployment bene¯ts as well as combined wages, for workers of type 2 respectively
for workers in the labor market 2. We assume speci¯cally that workers of type 1
working in the ¯rst labor market (who are never unemployed during the normal
course of the established cyclical °uctuations in employment and income) have to
pay a \solidarity" contribution of size ¿!1Ld
1 out of their wage income !1Ld
1 into
a fund R out of which unemployment bene¯ts and combined wages for the other
workers are paid. The redistribution scheme is therefore intra-redistributive among
workers type 1 as well as inter-redistributive between the two worker types. This
gives as law of accumulation for these funds R :
_ R = ¿!1Ld
1 | {z }
contributions
¡ Ã1(r)!u(L2 ¡ Ld(2))
| {z }
unemployment bene¯ts
¡ Ã2(!min ¡ !2)Ld
2 | {z }
wage subventions
; 1 ¡ ¿ > a (20)
The parameter Ã2, regulating minimum wage payments to workers in the second
segment if the labor market, is equal to zero for !min < !2 and it is equal to one for
!min ¸ !2. Moreover, there may be times when the funds R get exhausted (become
zero). In order to prevent this over the normal course of the cycle, we assume that
unemployment bene¯ts (Ã1(r)!u) are a linearly increasing function of r = R=K (in
the range [0;r¤]), with Ã1(0) = 0;Ã1(r¤) = 1 and r¤ the steady state value of r (to
be determined still). This assumes that unemployment bene¯ts are reduced linearly
to zero if the fund for supporting workers of type 2 gets exhausted. Of course, other
schemes are equally easy to introduce, for examples schemes that take the duration
of unemployment into account. It here only serves the purpose that funds R can stay
positive in principle if appropriate parameters are used to simulate the model. The
justi¯cation for such a statement is that they have to be chosen such that combined
wage payments can always be covered out of the new payments ¿!1Ld
1 during the
period where they are actually paid.
For the evolution of funds r = R=K per unit of capital this gives7
_ r = ¿v1¹ x ¡
r
r¤!u(l ¡ ¹ x=¹ y1 ¡ ¹ x=¹ y2) ¡ Ã2(vmin ¡ v2)¹ x ¡ (¹ x(1 ¡ v1 ¡ v2) ¡ ±)r (21)
7due to _ r = _ R=K ¡ ^ Kr.
12with vmin = !min=¹ y2 < v¤
2 and !u given magnitudes. If the state variables v1;e1 are
in their steady state position we get as special case
_ r = ¿v¤
1=¹ x ¡
r
r¤!u(l¤ ¡ ¹ x=¹ y1 ¡ ¹ x=¹ y2) (22)
We here assume ¯nally that the value of r¤ is given from the outside and that the
value of !u is chosen such that _ r = 0 holds at r = r¤:
This set of assumptions for the evolution of the variable r simply tailors the sit-
uation such that unemployment bene¯t payments and combined wages can actually
be realized according to the rules just described. They serve the purpose to show
how the Goodwinian cycle dynamics with two types of workers can be augmented
such that basic needs of the workers of type 2 can be met in order to avoid their
human degradation during the downswings of the cycle, with respect to employment
by the bene¯ts and with respect to wages in the second segment in the labor market
by extra wage payments out of the funds R:
The important issue here is that these solidarity payments between workers em-
ployed in the ¯rst labor market and those temporarily or permanently in the second
labor do not at all alter the accumulation dynamics shown in ¯gure 4, since they only
represent a redistribution of wages between workers that does not alter their total
consumption of produced goods. The inclusion of such transfer payments therefore
mitigate the lot of the poor workers, but do not question at all the two-level dis-
tributive reserve army mechanism of Goodwin type (with its typical overshooting
e®ects in income distribution and employment at the aggregate) we have introduced
in the previous section.
3 Free hiring and ¯ring, income security and socially acceptable
reserve army °uctuations
3.1 Human rights: Basic income and minimum wages
1 Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against un-
employment.
2 Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay
for equal work.
3 Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remuner-
ation ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of
13human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of
social protection.
4 Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
United Nations (1998, article 23): Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948 (http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html)
Our purpose is to show that the quoted article 23 from the United Nations'
declaration of Human Rights does not only represent a normative political statement,
but can also be justi¯ed from the economic point of view in the context of analysis
of the process of capital accumulation of this paper. We believe that capitalism is
a very robust system of resource allocation and income distribution that can adjust
to many social restrictions if these restrictions are justi¯ed from a normative point
of view.8
In this section, we therefore augment the analysis of the working of the reserve
army mechanism in a capitalist economy of the preceding section by two fundamental
human rights: the right for basic (of course: real) income when getting unemployed
(that cannot and need not be adjusted to lower values as in the preceding section),
and the right to earn fair wages i.e. that do not fall below a certain real minimum
level. Of course, there are also obligations connected with the formulations of these
rights which concern the obligation to work, the need of skill preservation when
unemployed and the provision of adequate social services for the considered society
(as in a workfare system). In this paper however our focus relies on the macroe-
conomic sustainability of these minimum restrictions on the working of a capitalist
economy and not on the detailed analysis on how such a system can work at the
microlevel. We will argue that the social costs of reproduction mechanisms as they
are shown in ¯gures 3 and 4 are much higher than those produced within the above
minimum restrictions by a capitalist economy and that it is the duty of capital as
well as of labor to provide the necessary behavior such that these restrictions can be
realized not only theoretically, but also { at least { in actual (advanced) capitalist
democracies.
8For more detailed discussions of such an approach, the reader is referred to Bowles, Gordon
and Weisskopf's (1983) work `Beyond the Waste Land' and in particular to their chapter on \an
economic bill of rights".
143.2 Capital's and labor's responsibility: Minimum wages and basic
income needs
We saw that in the queuing model neither the dynamics of the model nor its equi-
librium values are altered if a redistribution scheme is introduced although the lot
of the workers of type 2 greatly increase. In this section we consider another type
of labor market which involves segmentation features and therefore is perhaps more
realistic for European economies. In this market type workers of type 1 if they do
not ¯nd a job on the labor market 1 become now unemployed (they do not evict
workers of type 2 from their job positions in the labor market 2). Both labor markets
functions in the same way and are represented graphically in ¯gure 5.
Figure 5: Labor market system in graphical form
Wages are still bargained in labor market 1 only and along a slightly modi¯ed
Phillips curve:
^ w1 = ¯we(e1 ¡ ¹ e1) + ^ p (23)
This simpli¯cation is justi¯ed, since we will now assume that unemployment
bene¯ts for workers of the ¯rst type are higher than the wages paid to workers of the
second type. The real wages of workers of type 2 are assumed now to be fully ¯xed
to the one of workers of type 1 by a factor a and thus no longer overproportionally
shrinking in periods of a depressed economy:
!2 = a!1; !1 > !min
1 (24)
Workers of type 2 are still not actively involved in wage negotiations, while workers
of type 1 are negotiating nominal wages as in Goodwin (1967). Workers of type 1 do
not enter the second labor market now,9 i.e., the employment rates in both sectors
9This requires the validity of !1u > a!1 for the admissible employment cycles of the model.
15are now the ones of the two types of workers as pictured in ¯gure 5. Following the













Goodwin's accumulation equation is unchanged and reads:
^ K = _ K=K =




= ¹ x(1 ¡ (1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2)v1) ¡ ±: (26)
Using again Y=K = const. and Y=Ld
1 = const, we get from the de¯nitional
equation e1 = Ld
1=¹ L1 the law of motion of this employment rate of workers of type
1 (¹ L1 = const):
^ e1 = ^ K = ¹ x(1 ¡ v1 ¡ v2) ¡ ± = ¹ x(1 ¡ v1 ¡ a¹ y1=¹ y2v1) ¡ ± (27)
From the above equation we get an autonomous 2D system of di®erential equa-
tions in the state variables v1;e1:
_ v1 = ¯we(e1 ¡ ¹ e1)v1 (28)
_ e1 = [¹ x(1 ¡ (1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2)v1) ¡ ±]e1: (29)
This system is of the original Goodwin (1967) type and no longer subject to
intimidating e®ects we considered in the preceding section with respect to workers
of type 1 and 2.10
For the evolution of unemployment funds r = R=K per unit of capital we now
assume:
_ r = ¿1v1=¹ x ¡ !1u(1 ¡ e1)l1 + ¿2v2¹ x ¡ !2u(1 ¡ e2)l2 (30)
where li = ¹ x=(¹ yiei);i = 1;2 now. There are no further deductions her, since mini-
mum wages
!1 > !min
1 ; !2 > !min
2 = a!min
1
have to be paid by ¯rms now due to legislation. We assume that the contributions
to the unemployment bene¯ts are regulated such that they are equal to bene¯ts
10Figures 3 and 4 are further valid in the aggregate. The °uctuations in the employment rate of
the workers of type 2 are however smaller.
16payments for each group separately in the steady state11 de¯ned as:
v¤
1 =













We thus have in sum now a standard Goodwinian dynamics augmented by un-
employment bene¯ts for the two groups of workers which depending on the size of
the cycle that is in operation demand for a certain initial value of R in order to
get the sustainability of bene¯ts payments over the cycle. Here the redistribution
scheme is only intra-redistributive for each type of worker separately.12
The question now however is how the dynamics of the original Goodwin model
are modi¯ed in the large through the assumption of a minimum wage rate for the
employed workers that is not organized via wages subventions, but that has to be
paid by ¯rms. Figure 6 shows what is happening in the employment cycle dynamics
if a minimum wage restriction !min
1 > !1u;!min
2 > !2u is added to the model.
Figure 6: The distributive cycle with a minimum wage restriction
As long as the unrestricted cycle moves inside the grey area, nothing is changed
because the minimum real wage is less than the lowest real wage along this cycle;
The minimum wage restriction is in this case not binding. If however, as shown





; i = 1;2 holds true, expressions that can be shown to be smaller
than 0:05 for reasonable parameter constellations.
12This may be seen as an unrealistic speci¯cation but a modi¯cation where the funds payments
would be pooled and redistributed to all unemployed according to their respective type (which
match much more the European unemployment bene¯ts systems) would not alter the results.
17by the largest cycle, the minimum wage bound is hit, the economy will move along
this boundary upwards (since pro¯tability is above the steady state pro¯t rate) until
the NAIRU rate of employment is reached. From there on real wages will be rising
again along the cycle that is just tangent to the minimum wage restriction. The
result therefore is that all larger cycles will be dampened towards this boundary
case (around the grey area in ¯gure 6). Minimum real wages therefore make the
°uctuations the economy is subject to less severe, reduce among other stag°ationary
periods, and diminish the volatility in the employment rate in the longer run.
This is clearly an economically more desirable situation,13 since excessive °uctu-
ations of the aggregate employment rate are avoided now. This positive judgment is
further strengthened due to the fact that all social consequences of unemployment
can be avoided now through the transfer payments underlying this tamed operation
of the Classical reserve army mechanism. Moreover, increasing minimum real wages
moderately (to ensure that it will not exceed v¤
1) will improve this situation further
while a return to a cold turkey strategy of no minimum wages at all may be the
faster solution to end the depression, but one that reintroduces larger °uctuations
in the employment rate and income distribution with all their social consequences.
We thus have an improvement of the accumulation dynamics implied by the model
supplemented by a system of unemployment bene¯t payments that { if appropriately
tailored { can be maintained along the cycle.
Instead of pursuing such a radical strategy, this paper would propose a further
re°ection of the strategies that will make the distributive cycle even less severe and
maybe also convergent to the steady state of the economy. The addition of Blan-
chard and Katz (1999) error correction may be a candidate here, being neoclassical
smooth factor substitution another stabilizing mechanism,14 (and, of course, any
dialogue between workers' union and capitalists' unions can also be of help). The
advantage of the Goodwin approach to the employment cycle is that it is not biased
against capitalist interest, since it entails that workers' union bear responsibility
for overshooting wage share and unemployment rates in the prosperity phase of the
cycle.15 Minimum wages come to the help of workers' unions in stagnant phases by
avoiding more severe unemployment situations. Their responsibility however is to
provide a similar mechanisms for the situation to the right of ¯gure 6, see the next
13Here we assume implicitely as standard in the literature that any departure from the steady-
state is welfare reducing and that the welfare losses increase exponentially with the distance from
steady-state.
14see Flaschel (2008, ch.4).
15See WÄ orgÄ otter (1986) for the details of such an observation.
18section, where prudent wage policies (and supporting ¯scal and monetary policies)
have to be found that avoid the occurrence of severe stag°ation and its twin evils.
3.3 Capital's and Union's responsibility: Upper bounds for real
wage increases
One may ask how the lower °oor to real wage payments is in fact monitored in a so-
ciety where wage negotiations are about money wages and not about real wages and
are subject to collective bargaining (tari® autonomy). The answer to this question
is however on the theoretical level not a di±cult one, since it only demands that
wage in°ation has to be adjusted to price in°ation (as in the Italian scala mobile
case or in the French adjustment rule for the minimum wage) when minimum real
wages are reached and as long as employment is below the NAIRU. The problem
may of course be to reach agreement between capital and labor on the management
of wage in°ation in this phase of the distributive cycle, here primarily concerning
capital, since labor is in the weaker position.
Figure 7: The distributive cycle with a maximum wage restriction
A compensation that can be o®ered by labor is that a similar rule is applied when
labor is in a strong position, i.e., when the maximum real wage shown in ¯gure 7
has been reached. Wage in°ation is then higher than price in°ation (since the real
wage is increasing) and it demands now for a compromise primarily from the side
of workers' unions to accept that there will be only in°ationary compensation until
19again the NAIRU level ¹ e has been reached (now from above). If such an agreement
can be reached between capital and labor we get what is shown in ¯gure 7 and thus
a further improvement in the cyclical behavior that is generated by the wage-price
Phillips curve mechanism and the pace of capital accumulation this implies.
The choice of the correct levels of minimum and maximum wages may however
run into problems when set to close to the unobserved steady state level. Though this
may dampen, on the one hand, the °uctuations in the rate of employment further
if it really stays below (above) !¤, it will, on the other hand, lead to disastrous
consequences if set above the steady state level, since pro¯ts are then not su±cient
to maintain even the current level of the employment rate which will fall without
limit then if this choice of the minimum wage level is not revised. It may therefore
be wise to use the minimum with a sense for proportions and look for help from the
maximum real wage level in order to tailor the °uctuations in income distribution
and employment in the best achievable way.
3.4 Automatic stabilizers: Blanchard and Katz error correction
terms
We make use here of Blanchard and Katz's (1999) microfoundation of the wage
Phillips curve which adds a wage share error correction term to the wage PC of
this section. This microfounded type of Phillips curve extends the wage PC in the
following way:
^ w1 = ¯we(e1 ¡ ¹ e1) ¡ ¯wv(v1 ¡ v¤
1) + ^ p (32)
We stress that the Blanchard and Katz (1999) approach makes use of a reservation
wage (in a wage curve not Phillips curve setup) that is independent from the other
labor market so that we now have v1 in the implied wage Phillips curve in place
of its extension by a v2 expression in the preceding section. The dynamics to be
investigated now reads:
_ v1 = [¯we(e1 ¡ ¹ e1) ¡ ¯wv(v1 ¡ v¤
1)]v1 (33)
_ e1 = [¹ x(1 ¡ (1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2)v1) ¡ ±]e1: (34)





¯we(~ e1 ¡ e¤




(¹ x(1 ¡ (1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2)~ v1) ¡ ±)=~ v1 d~ v1
20we get with respect to these dynamics the result:
_ H = Hv1 _ v1 + He1 _ e1
= ¡(¹ x(1 ¡ (1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2)~ v1) ¡ ±)^ v1 + ¯we(e1 ¡ ¹ e1)^ e1
= ¡(¹ x(1 ¡ (1 + a¹ y1=¹ y2)~ v1) ¡ ±)(¡¯wv(v1 ¡ v¤
1))
= (¹ x(1 + a)(v¤
1 ¡ v1)¯wv(v1 ¡ v¤
1) = ¡¹ x¯wv(v1 ¡ v¤
1)2 · 0
The above potential function H is easily shown to be of the following qualitative
form:
Figure 8: A Liapunov function for the dynamics of this section
Setting ¯wv = 0 implies { due to the above { that the function H(v1;e1) is
constant along the trajectories of the simple Goodwin model this implies. The
orbits of the above dynamics are then (as is well known) all closed curves, obtained
by projecting the height lines in the ¯gure 8 into the phase space of v1;e1:
The unrestricted Goodwin employment cycle with ¯wv > 0 is however loosing
height in the shown graph of the function H: Adding the Blanchard and Katz error
correction term implies therefore that the dynamics are then globally convergent to
the steady state of the economy, due to the facts that a) the function H is a global
sink and b) the value of H is decreasing along the trajectories as was calculated
above. To put it di®erently: The trajectories of the dynamics with the Blanchard
and Katz error correction switched on are (nearly) always pointing inwards with
respect to the closed orbits structure of the original Goodwin model. They must
therefore converge to the steady state.
21Since the cycles that so far resulted from either minimum or maximum real
wages are tangent to these restrictions, we get from the above that they are only
needed once to restrict the unrestricted excessive cycle to them. Thereafter such
bounds are no longer necessary, since the next cycle remains inside of these bounds
and converges to the steady state eventually. We thus get from the microfounded
wage PC of Blanchard and Katz (1999) type, at least for Europe as their study is
concerned, that minimum and maximum wages will dampen the °uctuations of the
unrestricted reserve army mechanism signi¯cantly and make it thereafter convergent
to its long run equilibrium position.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we departed from the conventional discussion of the impact of minimum
wage legislation, which is only partial in nature, by considering the macroeconomic
e®ects of such legislation or agreements between capital and labor. We think that
sector speci¯c rules concerning minimum wages can only be discussed against the
background of such macrofoundations where the medium- and long-run consequences
of minimum wages are the focus of interest and not so much the short-run adjustment
problems such a legislation may cause.
Especially we have showed that for both labor market speci¯cations (with queu-
ing and with segmentation features) the introduction of a redistribution scheme
(unemployment bene¯t and eventually wage subvention from a fund) do neither
change the equilibrium values of the system nor its dynamics. We modi¯ed for the
segmentation model, as it is a more realistic model for Europe, the redistribution
scheme by introducing a minimum wage, i.e. a wage level that will not vary with
the state of the fund but that is exogenously ¯xed by law. In this case too the
equilibrium values are not altered, provided the minimum wages (for workers type
1 and 2 respectively) are not set too generously. The dynamics is reduced within
bounds (de¯ned by these minimum wages). So far, the minimum wage increases
welfare in reducing the volatility of the cyclical up's and down's. The introduction
of an error-correction term µ a la Blanchard and Katz (1999) in the Phillips curve even
dampen the cyclical volatility toward the equilibrium values, still without a®ecting
their levels.
We conclude however from what has been shown in this paper that the intro-
duction of a general level of minimum (or maximum) real wages for both skilled
and unskilled labor into a supply-side macro model of °uctuating employment does
22not do much harm to capital accumulation and employment even in the shorter run
and does de¯nitely and signi¯cantly improve the performance of the implied cyclical
employment path in the course of time. The introduction of a minimum wage does
not only decrease to a larger extent the severity of °uctuations in the unemploy-
ment rates than in the unrestricted case (where there is an unlimited functioning
of the wage-price spiral and the reserve army mechanism), but can also avoid the
social consequences of mass unemployment through basic income payments { and
an employer of last resort, if meaningful activities of the unemployed are added to
the reformulated social structure of accumulation. An advanced society, in which
the principle of equal opportunities holds in its schooling system, and where the
unskilled/skilled distinction is turned into a skilled/high skilled distinction, may be
a very important ingredient in the working of such a social structure, where par-
tial workforce degradation is avoided by meaningful quali¯cation processes of the
unemployed and also life-long learning of the employed, see Flaschel, Greiner and
Luchtenberg (2008) for further details on such a scenario.
The traverse to such an educated °exicurity system, where the notion of un-
skilled labor no longer applies, is however much more di±cult to analyze than the
simple traverses shown in the preceding section that led us away from ruthless ad-
vantage taking (by workers in the boom and by capital in the depression) towards
a workfare type social structure of accumulation with considerably less severe °uc-
tuations in employment rates and income distribution. Of course, there are, here
too, practical obstacles on the way towards such a social structure of accumulation,
given for example by the factual sclerosis of existing social structures (degraded
long-term unemployed persons, segmented labor markets, degrading job o®ers and
more). Globalization may also represent a big challenge for our reformulated Good-
win employment cycle dynamics, concerning international competition for traded
commodities and services, workforce migration, outsourcing and more. This how-
ever essentially demands that the baseline workfare system discussed in this paper
needs further re¯nements e.g. along the lines proposed in the Flaschel (2008, ch.10).
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24A Abbreviations
Table 1: Variables in (nearly) order of appearence
Symbol Math. Def. Description
¹; ¤ Exogenous variable resp. endogenous steady-state value
^ x; _ x Growth rate of x resp. absolute change of x
¹ L1 Labor supply of workers of type 1, exogenously ¯xed
¹ L2 Labor supply of workers of type 2, exogenously ¯xed
¹ x = Y=K Output-capital ratio, exogenous productivity
Y Output (real)
K Capital (real)
¹ y1 = Y=Ld
1 Exogenous labor productivity in labor market 1
¹ y2 = Y=Ld
2 Exogenous labor productivity in labor market 2
Ld
1 = Y= ¹ y1 Workers (of type 1) employed in labor market 1
Ld
2 = Y= ¹ y2 Workers (of types 1 and 2) employed in labor market 2
w1 Money wage (of workers type 1) in labor market 1
w2 Money wage (of workers types 1and 2) in labor market 2
!1 Real wage (of workers types 1) in labor market 1
!2 Real wage (of workers types 1 and 2) in labor market 2
e1 = Ld
1=¹ L1 Employment rate of workers type 1 in labor market 1
e2 = Ld
2=¹ L2 Employment rate of workers type 2 in labor market 2
¼e = ^ p Expected in°ation rate (of myopic type)
v1 w1Ld
1=pY Wage share of workers employed in labor market 1
= !1=¹ y1
v2 w2Ld
2=pY Wage share of workers employed in labor market 2
= !2=¹ y2
sc ; sw sc=1, sw=0 Propensities to consume resp. to save
± Depreciation rate of capital
l1 =¹ L1=K
=¹ x=(e1¹ y1)
Labor supply-capital ratio of workers of type 1
l2 =¹ L2=K
=¹ x=(e2¹ y2)
Labor supply-capital ratio of workers of type 2
l = l1 + l2
v(2) =w2Ld(2)=pY
6= v2
Wage share of workers type 2
¿ (queuing
model)
Contribution tax rate on wages in labor market 1
Table continues on next page...
25Table 1: (continued)
Symbol Math. Def. Description
!u (queuing
model)
Exogeneously set real unemployment bene¯ts for unem-
ployed workers of type 2
!min (queuing
model)
Exogeneously set real minimum wage in labor market 2
Ã1(r) with Ã1(0)=0
and Ã1(r¤)=1
Varying parameter regulating minimum wage payments in
labor market 2
Ã2 = 0 or 1 Dummy variable controlling the payment of unemployment
bene¯ts in dependence of the state of the fund (R).
R Social security fund




exogenous variable, set by legislation
¿1 ; ¿2 (segmented
model)
Contribution tax rate on wages in labor market 1 resp. in
labor market 2
!1u ; !2u (segmented
model)
Exogeneously set real unemployment bene¯ts for unem-
ployed workers of type 1 resp. of type 2
Coe±cients
¯we ; ¯wv Coe±cients of the Phillips curve (labor market 1)
a; b Coe±cients of the wage-setting rule in labor market 2
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